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THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
III. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
AND FISCAL MATTERS
LEGAL ASPECTS
B. International Monetary System
MONEY AND FINANCE - INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT ARE AMENDED.
The United States recently accepted the amendments to the
International Monetary Fund Articles of Agreement.1 Included
in the amendments are provisions for the legitimation of floating
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X. Similarly, the court in N.L.R.B. v. International
Longshoremen's Association, 332 F.2d at 999 stated:
The First Amendment affords protection not merely to the voicing of abstract
opinions upon public issues. It also protects implementing conduct which is in
the nature of advocacy. Union members need not mount a platform to voice
their moral revulsion against Castro; if they deem it more appropriate, in their
circumstances, to express their sentiments by refusing to assist a vessel that
trades with him, they are at liberty to do so. Nothing in our labor laws speaks
to the contrary.
1. Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1970). Before the
Amendments to the IMF Articles become effective, they must be enacted by the IMF
governments, a process which is expected to be completed by mid-1977.
TOPICAL SURVEY
exchange rates, the decreased role of gold, and changes in mem-
bers' subscription quotas.
The amendment to Article IV of the IMF Articles of Agree-
ment eliminates members' obligations to maintain a gold par
value for their currencies. It also provides an optional par value
system which could be adopted if the "floating" system did not
adequately contribute to stability in world currency markets.
The amendment also requires IMF supervision of exchange rates
to prevent manipulation of currency values.2
This particular provision should have little immediate im-
pact on world trade because the amendment is a legitimation
of the already widespread phenomenon of floating exchange rates,
rather than the implementation of any change in common trade
practices.3 However, the abandonment of the par value system
may complicate the drafting of those international contracts,
statutes or treaties which require reference to a common monetary
unit. For example, damage clauses and long-range pricing mechan-
isms are vulnerable to fluctuations in parity. Theoretically, as
long as parties can rely on and refer to legally required currency
values, that is, par values, this vulnerability can be formally
limited, or at least accounted for, in their transactions. Without
this legal standard, the parties must create their own mechanism
for computing and maintaining the value of the transaction, and
this mechanism must incorporate the prospect of changes in the
currencies' values as they "float." As a practical matter, this
potential problem has been recognized and in part resolved by
agreements to conduct business in a particularly strong currency,
rather than relying on formal par values. Another possible solu-
tion is an increased use of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), dis-
cussed below.5
A corollary to the amendment to Article IV is the changed
role of gold in the International Monetary Fund's transactions.
2. Hearings on International Monetary Reform Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Trade, Investment and Monetary Policy of the House Comm. on Banking,
Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1976) (statement of Edwin H. Yeo,
III, Under Secretary for Monetary Affairs of the Treasury) [hereinafter cited as
Yeo testimony].
3. REPORT ON H.R. 13955, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976).
4. "Parity" is the value of one currency in terms of another currency, or as
both are defined in terms of a third currency.
5. J. GOLD, FLOATING CURRENCIES, GOLD, AND SDRs: SOME RFCENT LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS (IMF Pamphlet Series 'No. 19, 1976).
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In addition to abolishing the gold-based par value of member
currencies, the IMF will no longer require that a portion of sub-
scription quotas be payable in gold, or use gold in dealings with
its members. The Fund will also be empowered to liquidate its
gold holdings by auctions at prevailing market rates and by dis-
tribution to members at the "official," "book" price. Decisions
regarding gold disposals under the amended Articles of Agreement
would be subject to approval by an 85 per cent majority of the
members of the Fund. Thereafter, the official price of gold would
not be maintained except for distribution to member countries.6
These changes reflect the view that the monetary significance
of gold should be decreased, and that it should not be the standard
for determining the relative values of IMF member currencies.7
Instead, SDRs would function as the standard reserve asset.
SDRs are the basic unit defining IMF transactions, rights and
obligations. Their value is predicated on and re-aligned according
to the market value of a group of selected IMF member cur-
rencies.8
The amendments also include an increase in members' sub-
scription quotas and changes in relative voting power. Under the
amended Articles, the United States, for instance, will have to
increase its membership contribution to the IMF, but its rela-
tive voting power will be decreased from 20.75 per cent to 19.96
per cent. The change in voting strength will not affect the United
State's veto, however, since the majority vote requirement has
been increased from 80 per cent to 85 per cent.'
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6. REPORT ON H.R. 13955, supra note 3 at 4, 5; Yeo testimony, supra note 2,
at 2, 3.
It should be noted that the current sales of IMF gold, and the use of the book
profit, the difference between the selling price and the official price, for the Trust
Fund for the less developed countries, are proceeding under the present Articles
of Agreement. These sales of one-sixth of the IMF gold reserves, and the use
of the profit for interim balance of payments financing for LDCs would not be
affected by the Amendments. Any future gold sales' profit would be transferred
to the Fund's general resources, unless a different application were authorized by
an 85 per cent majority of the Fund members.
7. REPORT ON H.R. 13955, supra note 3, at 4-5; Yeo testimony, supra note 2,
at 15.
8. For a general discussion of SDR valuation, see IMF, Annex 9: Valuation
of the SDR: Possible Operational Provisions, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY REFORM:
DOCUMENTS OF THE CommiTTEz OF TWENTY 43 (1974).
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